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By  JEREMY  BULOW AND KENNETH ROGOFF* 
We show that, under  fairly general conditions,  lending to small countries  must be 
supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors, and cannot be supported 
by a country's "reputation  for repayment."  This distinction is critically important 
for understanding  the true underlying  structure  of sovereign lending contracts,  and 
comparing  policy alternatives  for dealing with the developing country debt prob- 
lem. 
The  period  from  1973  to  1982  saw  a 
startling increase in  the volume  of  interna- 
tional  loans  to  less-developed  countries. A 
central  issue  in  analyzing  LDC  loan  con- 
tracts is  whether, and by what mechanism, 
these  contracts  can  be  enforced.'  Whereas 
domestic  loans  are generally supported by 
substantial collateral, the assets that can be 
appropriated  in  the  event  of  a  sovereign's 
default are generally negligible. For this rea- 
son one must look beyond collateral to find 
incentives for repayment. 
An influential body of research holds that 
a  small  country  can  enjoy  at  least  some 
access to world capital markets by maintain- 
ing a reputation for repaying its loans.2 Ac- 
cording  to  this  approach, a country makes 
repayments  on  its  foreign debt  in  order to 
preserve reputational "collateral" needed for 
future borrowing. The obvious appeal of pure 
reputation  theories is that they seem robust 
to institutional  detail. One does not have to 
speculate  on  the  legal  rights  of  creditors 
within their own countries' courts, or on the 
ability  of  creditors  to  induce  their govern- 
ments to take retaliatory actions. 
But  we  have  come  to  query reputation- 
for-repayment  theories, not  to  praise them. 
Our analysis  establishes rather general con- 
ditions  under which  small countries  cannot 
establish a reputation for repayment. If these 
conditions  are met empirically, then loans to 
LDCs  are  possible  only  if  creditors  have 
either political  rights which enable them to 
threaten  the  debtor's  interests  outside  its 
borrowing relationships, or legal rights. Le- 
gal rights might include the ability to impede 
a  country's  trade,  or  to  seize  its  financial 
assets abroad (which is the real reason why a 
defaulter  suffers  reduced  access  to  capital 
markets). Admittedly, there are many uncer- 
tainties surrounding the actual damage which 
a lender can inflict on an LDC; it is a gray 
area of  Western  law.3 But if  one  wants to 
understand  LDC  loan contracts, then these 
costs must be studied further. 
1. The Model 
Our paradigm is  of  a small country that 
faces  competitive,  risk-neutral  foreign  in- 
vestors.  (It  is  straightforward to extend our 
*Graduate School  of  Business, Stanford University, 
Stanford, CA  94305 and Economics Department, Uni- 
versity of  Wisconsin,  Madison, Wisconsin  53706. This 
work has been  supported by grants from the National 
Science Foundation  under grant no. SES-87-20800 and 
the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
1Theories that ignor'e  contract enforcement problems 
suggest  that  there should be  far greater integration of 
world  capital  markets  than  currently  occurs.  For  a 
survey of the empirical evidence on international capital 
mobility,  see Maurice Obstfeld (1986). 
2Examples  include Jonathan Eaton, Mark Gersovitz, 
and  Joseph  Stiglitz  (1986);  Herschel  Grossman  and 
John Van Huyck (1988); Rodolfo Manuelli (1986); and 
Harold  Cole  and  William  English (1987).  Eaton  and 
Gersovitz (1981) present a model in which the threat of 
capital market autarky provides debtors with an incen- 
tive to make repayments. However, they do not empha- 
size  a distinction  between a cutoff caused by  the legal 
rights of outstanding debt, and a cutoff caused by a loss 
of reputation for repayment. 
3For  a discussion of the legal evidence on this point, 
and  an  assessment  of  its  probable  empirical  signifi- 
cance, see Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff (1989), or 
Lewis Alexander (1987). 
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analysis  to  the  case  of  risk-averse foreign 
lenders.)  The  country is  small in  the sense 
that  it  cannot  affect the world interest rate 
r.4  It is inhabited by a single, infinitely lived 
representative  agent.  There  is  one  good, 
which  the  agent  both  produces  and  con- 
sumes.  Since  the  proof  of  our  theorem  is 
based  on  an  arbitrage argument, it  is  not 
necessary  to  place  any  restrictions on  the 
agent's  utility  function  other than that  she 
prefers having  more of  the good  to  having 
less. 
The country's production function is given 
by 
(1)  y=  t it- 
where  Y denotes  output,  and  t  subscripts 
denote  time.  0t(9t,,  tt-1'  ot-2,...);  the  Oi's 
are  exogenous,  serially independent  distur- 
bance  terms.  I,_  (I,-,,  It-2'I  It-3'  . . . ) 
where  It  is  investment in period  t. Net  ex- 
ports in period  t, Xt, are given by 
(2)  Xt = Yt-It-Ct, 
C  I>0;Y>O;C+I<Y*,  where  C  is  the 
country's consumption and Y* is world out- 
put. 
The  sequence  of  events within any given 
period  t  is  as  follows:  First,  a  shock  0t 
occurs  which  affects output  in  the  current 
period and possibly in future periods. After 
observing the shock, the country decides how 
to  divide  Y,  between  It,  Ct, and  Xt. Net 
exports can be used either to make payments 
on  various loans,  or  to increase asset hold- 
ings  abroad.  0t and  It  can be  observed by 
everyone;  there  is  no  private  information 
about aggregate variables. 
To  prove our theorem, it is not necessary 
to elaborate on the benefits of having access 
to  world  capital  markets.  It  may  aid  the 
reader's intuition, however, to briefly discuss 
these  advantages.  Through short-term bor- 
rowing  and  lending,  a  country  can  avoid 
having  to match the exact timing of import 
expenditures and export receipts. Having ac- 
cess  to  long-term loans allows a country to 
maintain  consumption  levels  in  the  short 
term while taking advantage of high-yielding 
domestic  investment  opportunities.  Finally, 
by  taking  advantage of  world capital mar- 
kets, a country can better insure itself against 
many types of risk, such as uncertainty over 
its terms of trade. 
We define the market value of a hypothet- 
ical  claim  to  the country's entire future net 
income as: 
(3)  Wt(  at) = Et E  ysl(l  + r)s 
- 
s =t 
where y = Y -  I. We will assume that y > 0 
always, an assumption which slightly simpli- 
fies our proofs.'  Note that W, is defined with 
reference  to  a  particular (possibly  reputa- 
tional)  equilibrium  path  and  that  expecta- 
tions,  Et,  are  taken with  reference to  that 
equilibrium.6 We assume that WO  < x,  which 
implies  that  for  any  finite  t,  W, <xo  with 
probability  one.  In other words, we  are as- 
suming  that  if  the  country were a firm, its 
market value would be finite. 
1.  Types  Of Lending  Contracts 
In a pure reputation-for-repayment ("rep- 
utation") contract, a country's foreign credi- 
tors  have  no  effective legal recourse in  the 
event  of default. They cannot interfere with 
the  country's  trade; they cannot even seize 
any financial assets it may hold abroad. The 
worst  fate  that  can  befall  a  country which 
defaults  on  a  reputation  contract  is  that 
4The  small  country  assumption, necessary  for  our 
results,  seems  appropriate  for  describing  the  LDCs' 
roles  in  world  capital  markets. For  example, in  1986 
Mexico,  Argentina,  Venezuela,  Colombia,  and  Chile 
had  combined  GNPs  within 1 percent of  the total for 
the  Benelux  countries.  The  combined  GNPs  of  the 
"Baker Fifteen"  group of  highly indebted countries is 
less than the gross income of greater Tokyo. 
5Though the case where y < 0 does not seem relevant 
empirically,  it  is  possible  in  theory. However, the net 
income  of  the  entire world,  y*_  Y*-  I*  must always 
be nonnegative. The assumption y > 0 can be dispensed 
with in  the proof  of Theorems 1 and 2 by replacing y 
with  y*  and W with W*. 
6Along any equilibrium path, I is a function of  G,  so 
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it  will  never again be allowed to write rep- 
utation  contracts.  However,  the  defaulting 
country cannot be cut off from international 
capital  markets entirely. Though it  may no 
longer be able to borrow for domestic invest- 
ment, it can still buy consumption-insurance 
contracts  by  paying  cash  in  advance.  A 
"cash-in-advance" contract is just a conven- 
tional  insurance  contract  under  which  a 
country makes a payment up front in return 
for  a  state-contingent,  nonnegative  future 
payment.  Implicitly,  we  are assuming  that 
there  are  foreign  investors  who  can  make 
commitments.  These  commitments  are  en- 
forced by the legal system in investors' coun- 
tries. Thus a small country can hold foreign 
assets such as bank accounts, treasury bills, 
stocks, and other state-contingent assets.7 Of 
course, it can also stockpile reserves of pre- 
cious metals and foreign currency. 
A.  Reputation Contracts 
Suppose the country were allowed to have 
a reputation contract which, in essence, is an 
implicit contract. For our purposes, it is not 
necessary  to  ask  what  set  of  off-the-equi- 
librium-path beliefs  might support the con- 
tract, nor is it important to ask whether the 
contract  is  optimal  in  any  sense.  All  one 
needs  to  know  is  that  any  reputation con- 
tract must  implicitly  specify a state-contin- 
gent payment  P,(O,) for all possible realiza- 
tions of  at,  and for all t.8 
Note  that  for  an  implicit contract to  be 
equilibrium, it  must be in the country's in- 
terest to honor the contract in every possible 
state  of  nature.  In  particular, the  country 
must  never have an incentive to  default on 
its  reputation  contract  and  switch  com- 
pletely  over  to  'cash-in-advance contracts. 
Otherwise,  the  contract is  not  the true im- 
plicit contract. 
Given the implicit contract, one can write 
the world market value of the country's rep- 
utation  debt  at  time  t, D,,  as  the  expected 
present-discounted value of its future repay- 
ments: 
(4)  Dt(--,)-Et(  EPsl(l+r)s  ) 
Clearly,  D, can never exceed W, the market 
value  of  a claim  to  the country's entire fu- 
ture output stream. Thus within any reputa- 
tional  equilibrium  there  must  exist  some 
k', 0 < k' < 1, such that with probability one 
Vt, 
(S)  Dt  (S)<  k W,at)  a 
Let k be the smallest k' such that condition 
(5) holds. 
B.  Cash-in-Advance  Contracts 
In  a  cash-in-advance  contract, the  coun- 
try pays the amount At at the end of period 
t  in  exchange  for  a  contract  which  pays 
Gt  +  1(Ot  +  1) in period t + 1. A cash-in-advance 
contract  can  always  be  indexed  to  all  the 
same  variables  as  the  implicit  reputation 
contract. Even if the country has forfeited its 
reputation  for honoring contracts, a foreign 
investor should always be willing to accept a 
cash-in-advance  contract as long  as it satis- 
fies two requirements:9 
(6)  Et  [G?(Ot+  l)I = (1+  r) At, 
(7)  Gt+1  0(t+l)  2  0,  V@,+t 
Condition (6) states that the contract must 
offer  the  risk-neutral  foreign  investor  the 
7Notable  efforts to study international lending in  a 
general equilibrium framework include Manuelli (1986) 
and Cole and English (1987). 
8This  specification  does  not  preclude  randomized 
strategies.  One  can  view  0, as a vector, one  of  whose 
elements has no effect on fundamentals such as output. 
If  the  foreign  investor  can  make  legal  commitments, 
then the implicit contract and the explicit legal contract 
will coincide whenever P < 0. In states of nature where 
P ?  0,  any  explicit  legal  contract  is  meaningless,  by 
assumption. 
9Here  we  are  only  defining  one-period  cash-in- 
advance contracts. In principle, the country could make 
a  payment  in  t-1  in  exchange  for (strictly positive) 
state-contingent  payments in  t, t + 1, t + 2, etc. For our 
purposes,  however,  multiperiod  cash-in-advance  con- 
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market  rate  of  return. Condition  (7)  says 
there can be no state of nature in which the 
country is called upon to make positive pay- 
ments  in period  t + 1. Obviously, one must 
also  have  At>  0,  but  this  condition  holds 
whenever (6)  and (7) hold. If one thinks of 
the  initial  payment  At  as  being  collateral, 
then condition  (7) can be interpreted as say- 
ing  that  the  country's  collateral  must  be 
sufficient to  cover its losses on  the contract 
even in the worst possible state of nature. 
III. Nonexistence  of Supportable 
Reputation  Contracts 
A.  Reputation Contracts  in the Absence 
of Direct Punishments 
We  are  now  ready  to  state  the  central 
theorem of this paper: 
THEOREM  1:  In  any  sequential  equilib- 
rium, D_  <  V  Vt. 
PROOF: 
Suppose  Ds > k(W, -  y5  Then the coun- 
try can cease payment on its reputation con- 
tract and initiate  the following  sequence of 
cash-in-advance contracts: 
For  all  t > s,  invest  At  in  return for  a 
payment  of  G +1  in  the  ensuing  period 
where: 
(8)  As(0s  Ps(  s+ 
k(Ws5- ys)-Ds, 
(9)  At(6at)=Gt(6at)+Pt1(6at1)-kyt, Vt>s, 
(10)  Gt  (s).=kWt(  at)-Dt(a),  t> 
Since  Dt < kWt, inspection  of  (10)  indi- 
cates that condition  (7) is satisfied. We note 
from (3) that 
(11)  Et(Wt+?) =  (1 + r)(Wt-yt) 
and from (4) that 
(12)  Et(Dt+1)  =(1+  r)(Dt-Pt). 
Straightforward substitution of (11) and (12) 
into (8), (9), and (10) yields immediate con- 
firmation of (6). Thus, the sequence of cash- 
in-advance  contracts  is  feasible.  Further- 
more, the country must pay only A, < Ps in 
period  s  and  P,-ky,<  P,  for  t>s,  with 
equality  holding  only  when  k = 0.  Thus  k 
must equal zero and by (5),  Dt < 0 Vt. 
That is, any (implicit) reputation contract 
must include at least some state of nature in 
which  the country will default. The country 
will  be  able  to  use  whatever repayment is 
demanded in that state of nature, an amount 
which  may  be  very  small  relative  to  out- 
standing debt, as initial collateral for a series 
of  cash-in-advance  contracts.  These  con- 
tracts will allow the country to have strictly 
higher  consumption  in  each  future  period 
than it would get under the reputation con- 
tract. This implies that the proposed implicit 
contract cannot be the true implicit contract. 
A  reputation  contract can  only  be  equilib- 
rium if  we  assume that the country cannot 
hold  foreign  assets  that are indexed  to  the 
same variables as the reputation contract. 
B.  Reputation Contracts When  Lenders 
Have Direct Means for Punishing Default 
In the preceding analysis, we assumed that 
holders of reputation contracts have no way 
to  directly  punish  the country if  it  repudi- 
ates.  Here  we  show  that if  there are some 
direct costs  which lenders can impose on  a 
country  in  the  event of  default, then loans 
can  be  sustained,  but  only  on  the basis  of 
these costs. 
Suppose  that  lenders have  the  ability  to 
impose  a  random  penalty  of  t(it,,qt)  if  a 
borrower stands in default in period t, where 
,q is  independent  of  6  and  yt >  ?t  0  O. The 
penalty causes the country's period-t output 
to be reduced by vt. Define 
00 
(13)  Ji t  EtEvs/(1+r)s  t. 
s = t 
Since  Dt  can  never  exceed  Wt, then  there 
must exist some q', 0 <  q' < 1,  such that with 
probability one, 
(14)  Dt-l1t<q'(WWt-r1t),  VOt  Vt. VOL. 79  NO.  1  BULOWAND  ROGOFF: SOVEREIGNDEBT  47 
Let  q  be  the minimum q' such that condi- 
tion (14) holds.  D, -  Hi can be thought of as 
the  amount of  debt not  supportable by  di- 
rect sanctions,  that is, reputation debt. We 
can then generalize Theorem 1 as follows: 
THEOREM  2:  In  any  sequential  equilib- 
rium, D, -  ,  < 0 Vt. 
PROOF: 
In the proof of Theorem 1, replace D, W, 
Pt, yt, and k with Dt f-It,  Wt  -J  t,  Pt-  Tt  , 
yt-  rt and q, respectively. 
Actually,  the bound given by Theorem 2 
may  be  too  high,  since countries can  typi- 
cally bargain with their creditors.'0 
IV. Limitations  And  Extensions 
Here  we  emphasize  some  limitations  on 
the scope of our result. 
A.  Reputation Outside  the Scope of the 
Lending Relationship 
What if  repudiation damages a country's 
general image beyond just its reputation for 
repaying its loans? One might, for example, 
envision  some  countries as  playing  a  tariff 
supergame, in which either raising tariffs or 
defaulting  on  foreign debt  triggers a costly 
trade war. Such a mechanism could conceiv- 
ably  support  a  positive  level  of  lending." 
However, Theorem 2 directly applies to this 
case.  The  maximum amount the country is 
allowed to borrow must be governed strictly 
by the costs of a trade war. We do not claim 
that reputation plays no role in international 
relations,  only  that  a  good  reputation  for 
repaying  foreign loans  does  not  enhance a 
small country's ability to borrow abroad. 
B.  Noncompetitive  Lenders 
As  long  as  the country faces competitive 
foreign investors,  then any service provided 
by  the  current  lender  (for  example,  insur- 
ance) can equally well be provided by a new 
investor.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  in 
practice there may be some efficiency gain in 
having the country continue to deal with its 
current lenders.  However, the upper bound 
on  any  "reputation"  debt  is  still  only  the 
real cost to the country of switching its busi- 
ness to a new set of financial institutions. 
C.  Verifiability  Problems  in Contracting 
We  have  assumed  that  the  country  can 
hold  assets abroad which are indexed to the 
same observable exogenous shocks, 6, as in a 
reputation  contract. An alternative assump- 
tion  is  that  6  is  "observable but not verifi- 
able." That is, the borrower, the lender, and 
all  potential  lenders  observe  6.  However, 
either because it is costly to verify 6 in court, 
or due to costs of contracting, the country is 
precluded  from  ever holding  foreign assets 
which  are  indexed  to  the  shock.  It  seems 
doubtful  that  this story can be used to  ex- 
plain  reputation contracts of any significant 
size, although this is ultimately an empirical 
question. 
It is hard to see what kind of shock would 
be  observable  to  a  huge  pool  of  potential 
(competitive) lenders, but cannot be put into 
contracts.12  True, one can make casual argu- 
ments as to why there might be limits on the 
kind of cash-in-advance contracts a country 
can  write.  But  it  is  important to  recognize 
that  these  same arguments also imply some 
limits on reputation contracts. In any event, 
it is not clear how well real-world LDC debt 
contracts  are implicitly indexed to country- 
specific disturbances. Shocks to LDCs' terms 
of  trade and  to  world interest rates clearly 
played a major role in precipitating the bank 
debt  reschedulings  of  the  past  decade  and 
also  the  bond  defaults  of  the  1930s.  Both 
W  See Bulow and Rogoff (1989) for a bargaining-theo- 
retic interpretation of rescheduling agreements. Because 
lenders do not benefit directly by impeding a country's 
access to world insurance markets or by interfering with 
its trade, they cannot in general prevent the debtor from 
bargaining over repayments. 
"Some  of  the broader incentives for repayment are 
discussed  by  Martin Feldstein, Herve Decarmoy, Koei 
Narusawa, and Paul Krugman (1987, p. 41). 
12The  concept of observable but not verifiable shocks 
makes more sense in the context of a bilateral monopoly 
relationship. 48  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  MARCH 1989 
these kinds of shocks can be hedged in world 
markets.  However,  Mexico  did  appear  to 
receive some help after its major earthquake 
in the mid-1980s. Empirical research on this 
issue would be valuable. 
D.  Difficulties in Observing  the 
Country's Actions 
Theorem 1 does not apply directly to the 
case  where lenders cannot  directly monitor 
the  country's  actions.'3 Suppose,  for exam- 
ple,  that  investors  observe output,  Y(O,  I), 
but they do not see I or 6. In this case, it is 
possible  to  characterize  any  reputational 
equilibrium as an implicit contract, in which 
the country's payments are given by P,(Yt). 
As before, the country always has the option 
of  switching  over  to  cash-in-advance  con- 
tracts, which can also be indexed to Y. How- 
ever,  the  terms  of  the  post-repudiation 
cash-in-advance  contracts  will  depend  on 
investors'  beliefs  about  the  country's  past 
investments.  If  a  default  at  time  s  leads 
investors  to  reassess their beliefs  about  the 
country's  capital  stock,  this  may  hurt  the 
terms insurers offer on cash-in-advance con- 
tracts. 
If this counterexample seems strained, it is 
because sequential equilibrium places no re- 
strictions  on  investors'  off-the-equilibrium 
path  beliefs;  see  David  Kreps and  Robert 
Wilson  (1982).  By applying a refinement of 
sequential equilibrium, it may be possible to 
extend  our result to the private information 
case.  This  question,  however,  can  only  be 
resolved after further research. 
One  should probably avoid attaching too 
much  weight  to  private information  about 
productivity  disturbances. We  suspect  that 
in the typical LDC, the country's leaders do 
not  know vastly  more about aggregate pro- 
ductivity shocks than do the country's major 
lenders.  Also,  as  we  have  argued above,  0 
may be highly correlated with external vari- 
ables,  and  therefore the  component  which 
can  potentially  be  private information may 
be minor. 
E.  The Country  's Preferences 
Are Unobservable 
Suppose that the country's income is con- 
stant  but  that  it  experiences  unobservable 
shocks to its marginal utility of income, along 
the  lines  of  Edward Green (1987).14  If  the 
country  could  have a reputation for repay- 
ment, it could use international capital mar- 
kets  to  provide  a line of  credit as a buffer 
against bad shocks. However, the credit line 
must  have  a  ceiling,  otherwise the  country 
could  run up  a  debt  exceeding the present 
value  of  all  its  future income.15 But if  the 
ceiling  is ever reached, the debtor will gain 
by repudiating its debts and thereafter plac- 
ing  its  funds  in  fixed-interest  rate  assets 
abroad. This  argument easily generalizes to 
the  case where there are observable as well 
as unobservable shocks. 
Alternatively,  suppose  (ala  David  Kreps 
and Robert Wilson, 1982), that investors be- 
lieve  that  there is  a  small chance  that  the 
country will always repay its debts out of a 
sense of moral obligation. A "selfish" debtor 
might then temporarily pose as an "altruist," 
but  will  still  always  repudiate once  D/W 
reaches  its  maximum value. We  conjecture 
that a small probability of  altruism can ex- 
plain  at most  a very small amount of lend- 
ing. 
F.  Restrictions  on the Use of 
Foreign-Currency  Reserves 
In some models, it is assumed that foreign 
investment goods can only be purchased with 
new  foreign loans  and cannot be purchased 
out  of  the country's own hard-currency re- 
serves  or  hard-currency export  earnings.16 
Thus a country can gain by repaying a lender 
P  dollars from its  foreign currency reserves 
in  exchange  for P -  E dollars worth of  new 
loans.  We believe  that the conventional  as- 
13 Kenneth  Kletzer  (1984)  considers  some  implica- 
tions of  private information for LDC contracts. For a 
more recent example, see Andrew Atkeson (1988). 
14In  Green's  closed-economy  model,  the debt  con- 
tract  can  be  enforced  via  direct  punishments  so  the 
problem discussed here does not arise. 
'5Using  similar  logic,  Roger  Gordon  and  Varian 
(1988) make an analogous point in the intergenerational 
risk-sharing literature. 
16See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1983), Cole 
and English (1987), or Grossman and Van Huyck (1988). VOL. 79  NO.  I  BULOWAND  ROGOFF: SOVEREIGN DEBT  49 
sumption,  that what a country can buy de- 
pends only on how much money it has avail- 
able to spend, is the correct one. 
V. Conclusions 
When a small country repudiates its debt, 
the legal rights of existing creditors will deter 
potential  new  lenders."7 However, those le- 
gal rights are necessary if  the country is to 
obtain  any loans  at all. Small countries will 
not meet loan obligations to maintain a rep- 
utation  for  repaying  because,  under  fairly 
general conditions,  it is impossible for them 
to have such a reputation. 
This  conclusion  does  depend  on  a  sov- 
ereign's ability to reproduce any risk-sharing 
advantages  of  loan  contracts by  holding  a 
portfolio  of  foreign  assets. Factors such as 
private information  may limit the country's 
ability to insure against its economic perfor- 
mance. But one must realize that these same 
factors  will  limit  implicit  reputation  con- 
tracts  as  well.  Therefore our no-reputation 
contracts  theorem  appears robust to  many 
considerations,  including  the  incorporation 
of  unobserved preference shocks. Note  that 
even  implicit  reputation contracts can  only 
be  indexed  to  shocks  which  are easily  ob- 
served, since small countries face a very large 
number  of  potential  lenders,  all  of  whom 
must  be  able  to  recognize any violation  of 
the contract. 
Of course, what our theorem really does is 
clarify  the conditions  required for an LDC 
to have a reputation for repayment. We have 
argued that these conditions are not plausi- 
ble in practice, but empirical work is needed 
in this area. 
The  issue  of  whether direct sanctions  or 
reputational factors underpin sovereign debt 
contracts is especially important in evaluat- 
ing  policy  alternatives for dealing with  the 
Third-World debt problem.18 One issue, for 
example, is whether various debt forgiveness 
schemes might adversely affect LDCs' future 
access  to  world capital markets, by hurting 
their reputations for repayment.19  We would 
argue  that  if,  through bargaining, an  LDC 
can induce its lenders to forgive a portion of 
its  debts  it  should  do  so.  Debts  which are 
forgiven will be forgotten. 
17  LDC bank loans are typically financed by multina- 
tional  lending  consortiums  with  banks  from  all  the 
LDC's  major industrial trading partners. This arrange- 
ment maximizes creditors' global legal rights. 
18For  analyses of policy alternatives on Third-World 
debt,  see Bulow and Rogoff (1988), Elhanan Helpman 
(1987),  and Kenneth Froot (1988). 
19Fred  Bergsten, William Cline, and John Williamson 
(1985)  analyze a wide variety of  schemes for resolving 
the  LDC  debt  problem.  They  discuss  how  different 
schemes  might  affect LDCs'  reputation for repayment 
and thereby their future access to world capital markets. 
Also,  John Reed,  the chairman of Citicorp, argues that 
"it's in the debtor countries' own interest to pay more. 
That way they'll  . . be able to borrow more freely again 
within  a short time." See "Citicorp's Reed Takes Firm 
Stance on Third-World Debt; Chairman Aims to Stem 
Commercial Banks' Trend Toward Concessions" by Pe- 
ter Truell (Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1987, p. 6.) 
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